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The Plant Patent Act of 1930 was the first step towards creating property rights for biological innovation:
it introduced patent rights for asexually-propagated plants.  This paper uses data on plant patents and
registrations of new varieties to examine whether the Act encouraged innovation.  Nearly half of all
plant patents between 1931 and 1970 were for roses.  Large commercial nurseries, which began to
build mass hybridization programs in the 1940s, accounted for most of these patents, suggesting that
the new intellectual property rights may have helped to encourage the development of a commercial
rose breeding industry.  Data on registrations of newly-created roses, however, yield no evidence of
an increase in innovation:  less than 20 percent of new roses were patented, European breeders continued
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In 1930, the US Congress established the first intellectual property rights (IPRs) for living 
organisms.  With the Plant Patent Act (PPA) it created patent rights to prevent the replication of 
genetic materials through roots and cuttings (rather than seeds).  Breeders of such “asexually-
propagated” plants, including fruit trees and roses, argued that they needed IPRs to recover large 
development costs.  By creating IPRs, the U.S. government hoped to encourage domestic 
innovation and the development of a domestic plant breeding industry.   
  This chapter uses historical data on patents and registrations of new plant varieties to 
examine the effects of the Plant Patent Act on biological innovation.  Evidence on a later Act, the 
Plant Variety Protection Act (PVPA) of 1970, is mixed.  The PVPA complemented the PPA by 
extending IPRs to plants that reproduce “sexually” through seeds, such as wheat, soybeans, or 
cotton.  Survey results suggest that it encouraged research expenditures and “stimulated the 
development of new varieties of wheat and soybeans" (Butler and Marion 1985, Perrin, 
Kunnings, and Ihnen 1983).  Most of these increases in research investments, however, came 
from the public sector, and there is little evidence that crops, and specifically wheat, performed 
better after 1970 (Alston and Venner 2002).
2  For cotton, on the other hand, changes in acreage 
and in the variety of cotton crops suggest a positive effect of IPRs (Naseem, Oehmke, and 
Schimmelpfennig, 2005).  
  The small number of patents for crop plants, such as fruit trees and vines, suggest that the 
effects of the Act on commercial agriculture were limited: “The great hopes for agriculture have 
                                           
2 Instead of arguing that IPRs failed to encourage innovation, Alston and Venner (2002) conclude that an exemption 
of the PVPA, which allows farmers to copy seeds for their own use, weakened breeders’ ability to appropriate the 
returns of R&D.  Another factor is that IPRs may have limited effects on crops that can be protected through secrecy 
(e.g., Moser 2010).  Secrecy is particularly effective to protect innovations in hybrid seeds whose desirable 
characteristics cannot be replicated by replanting the improved seeds.   Analyses of certificate data indicate that 
breeders of hybrid corn were reluctant to use IPRs (Janis and Kesan 2002; Dhar and Foltz 2007).     2 
not been realized… (Daus 1967, p. 394).”  For the rose industry, however, observers noted that 
“the Plant Patent Act cannot be deemed unsuccessful (Daus 1967, p.389).   
Nearly half of 3,010 plant patents granted between 1931 and 1970 were for roses.  Large 
commercial nurseries, which began to operate extensive mass hybridization programs in the 
1940s and 1950s, account for most of the plant patents, suggesting that the creation of IPRs may 
have helped to encourage the creation of a domestic U.S. rose industry (e.g.. Harkness 1985).  
Industry experts, however, cautioned that “Patented roses have not lived up to expectations” 
(Swecker 1944, p. 120).  A potential explanation for the discrepancy between the large number 
of rose patents and the disappointment about the PPA is that breeders may have used plant 
patents strategically to protect themselves from litigation (e.g. Kile 1934), so that increases in 
patenting do not reflect increases in innovation.  To separate changes in strategic patenting from 
changes in innovation, we collect data on registrations of new rose varieties as an alternative 
measure of innovation.     
Registration data show that U.S. breeders created fewer new varieties after 1930 
compared with before.  European breeders continued to create most roses after 1930, and only 
one American breeder was among the ten breeders with the largest number of registrations.  The 
data also show that only a small share of newly-developed roses – less than one in five – were 
patented.      
Notably, some of the most prominent American roses were based on European roses that 
U.S. nurseries had begun to license and propagate during the Second World War.  At a time 
when plant patents strengthened incentives to invest in R&D, U.S. nurseries also benefited from   3 
demand shock as a result of World War II when supplies from European markets were cut off 
and U.S. breeders began to grow and improve roses that had been developed abroad. 
 
I. THE PLANT PATENT ACT OF 1930 
  Although Congress had discussed IPRs for plants as early as 1885, it took food shortages 
during World War I and demands from the farm bloc states to “place agriculture on a basis of 
economic equality with industry” to create sufficient pressure for legislative action (Kloppenburg 
2004, p. 132; US House 1906, pp. 6-7; Olmstead and Rhode 2000).  Breeders of roses and fruit 
trees, such as Paul Stark of Stark Brothers Nursery, were the driving force behind the Act 
(Fowler 2000, pp. 628- 635; Kevles 2008, pp. 210-212, Terry 1966, pp. 30-34).  In the absence 
of IPRs, Stark Brothers had taken desperate measures to protect agricultural innovations.  In the 
mid-1910s it built a large cage, armed with a burglar alarm, to prevent competitors from stealing 
cuttings of the first Golden Delicious apple tree (Figure 1; Rossman 1930, pp. 394-395; Terry 
1966, p. 48).  Another large nursery, Jackson and Perkins, advised Congress in May 1930 that 
the plant patent legislation was “of very great importance to the agricultural and horticultural 
interests of the United States” and would provide “wonderful stimulus” (Congressional Record, 
71
st Cong., 2
nd Sess. May 12, 1930, p. 8751).
3   
  Thomas A. Edison (1847-1931) supported the Act in congressional debates: 
Nothing that Congress could do to help farming would be of greater value and permanence 
than to give the plant breeder the same status as the mechanical and chemical inventors now 
have through the patent law.  (US House 1930, pp. 2-3) 
                                           
3 In the 1950s and 1960s roses accounted for 15 to 20 percent of U.S. nursery sales, which includes other ornamental 
plants and fruit trees.    4 
Edison had been a close friend of Luther Burbank (1849-1926) an American breeder who had 
developed more than new 800 plant varieties (Smith 2009, pp. 308-309).  Edison observed that at 
present “there are but few plant breeders” and that patents would “give us many Burbanks.”
4  
When Fiorello (“Little Flower”) LaGuardia remarked that “Luther Burbank did very well 
without protection” (Congressional Record, 71
st Cong., 2
nd Sess. May 5 1930, p. 8391) 
supporters of the Act presented a letter from Burbank to Paul Stark: 
A man can patent a mousetrap or copyright a nasty song, but if he gives to the world a new 
fruit that will add millions to the value of earth’s annual harvest he will be fortunate if he is 
rewarded by so much as having his name connected with the result (US House 1930, p. 11).    
The Plant Patent Act passed in the House on May 13, and President Herbert Hoover signed it 
into law on May 23 (Allyn 1944. p. 13, Appendix A).  In its final report, Congress emphasized 
the importance of intellectual property rights in the absence of alternative mechanisms:  
To-day the plant breeder has no adequate financial incentive to enter upon his work.  A new 
variety once it has left the hands of the breeder may be reproduced in unlimited quantity by 
all.  The originator’s only hope of financial reimbursement is through high process for the 
comparatively few reproductions that he may dispose of during the first two or three years.  
After that time, depending upon the speed with which the plant may be asexually reproduced, 
the breeder loses all control of his discovery (US House 1930, pp. 10-11). 
By creating intellectual property rights the government hoped to attract private investments in 
R&D and support the creation of a domestic commercially viable plant breeding industry. 
Today plant breeding and research is dependent, in large part, upon Government funds to 
Government experiment stations, or the limited endeavors of the amateur breeder. It is hoped 
that the bill will afford a sound basis for investing capital in plant breeding and consequently 
plant development through private funds (US House 1930, p. 2).   
 
IPRs under the Plant Patent Act of 1930 
                                           
4 Edison had entered the field of experimental plant breeding when he was trying to increase the rubber content of 
goldenrod, a golden yellow American flower.  Edison’s experiments produced a 12-foot tall plant that yielded as 
much as 12 percent of especially resilient and long-lasting rubber, which Edison used to build tires for his own 
Model T.  Although Edison had turned his research over to the U.S. government in 1930, goldenrod rubber never 
went beyond the experimental stage (Rossman 1930, pp. 394-395.)   5 
To protect the property rights of private investors, the PPA granted 17 years of exclusive 
rights for new varieties of asexually propagated plants – plants that reproduce by roots, shoots, or 
buds.  Sexually propagated plants were excluded after plant scientists of the American Society of 
Horticultural Sciences argued that the characteristics of new varieties would not be genetically 
stable.  Paul Stark of Stark Brothers’ Nursery recalled that “it was clearly evident that no Plant 
Patent bill could be passed that included sexually propagated plants” (US Senate 1968, p. 863).
5  
The Act also excluded edible tubers – such as potatoes - possibly to prevent private firms from 
holding monopoly rights over U.S. food supplies (Allyn 1946, p.34).
6 
Compared with other types of patents, plant patents are narrower in scope (Daus 1967, 
p.392).  Similar to drug patents that cover a single molecule, plant patents cover only the asexual 
reproduction of an individual plant grown in cultivation; they do not cover the seeds of the new 
plant, or other plants with the same characteristics. Grant rates, measured as patent grants over 
publications are higher for plant patents than for other types of IPRs.  Thus, 92 percent of 
applications between 1961 and 1965 were accepted by the USPTO (576 grants over 628 
applications), compared with 59 percent for utility patents and 55 percent for design patents 
(Daus 1967, p. 392).  Plants did not have to be “useful” to be patentable (Allyn 1944, pp. 13-14).   
In principle, asexually-propagated plants have to be new, distinct, and not found in the 
wild to be patentable; in practice, however, sports – random bud variations that can be found in a 
                                           
5 Although the American Seed Trade Association wanted IPRs, Stark convinced them that the time was not ripe: “It 
seemed to be the wise thing to get established the principle that Congress recognized the rights of the plant breeder 
and originators. Then, in the light of experience, effort could be made to get protection also for seed propagated 
plants which would be much easier after this fundamental principle was established” (Fowler 1994, pp. 82-84 citing 
the American Seed Trade Association, 1930 Proceedings, p. 66).  Stark’s lobbying efforts cost the American 
Association of Nurserymen about $12,000 in 1930 ($130, 000 in 2009 purchasing power, White 1975, p. 132). 
6 Another argument against patents for tubers was that infringements are difficult to prove for tubers, so that patent 
rights would be difficult to enforce (US Senate 1968, p. 863).   6 
nursery, a garden, or in the wild – were frequently patented.
7  The Briarcliff rose, for example, 
which was not patented, yielded 7 sports that were patented; Talisman yielded 14 sports that 
were patented.
8  Two sports of Talisman, Souvenir (PP 25) and Mrs. Franklin D. Roosevelt (PP 
80) produced six sports, and every one of them was patented.  A sport of Briarcliff called Better 
Times (PP23) yielded 13 sports; the USPTO patented all of them.  At least one of these sports 
(PP452) yielded yet another generation of patented roses (Allyn 1944, p. 31, 50; and Fowler 
1994, pp. 86-88).   
In 1954 the USPTO ruled that “mere fortuitous finds” such as mutant seedlings were not 
patentable, but Congress quickly amended the law to include “chance seedlings producing 
distinct new plants, whether found in cultivated or uncultivated states” (White 1975, pp. 133, 
256-257, PL 83-775; Alston, Andersen, James, and Pardey 2010, p. 212).  
The PPA also excluded plants that had been introduced or sold to the public more than 
two years before the patent application, but most of the plants patented by 1934 were developed 
before 1930.
9  In 1944, the patent attorney Robert Starr Allyn observed that “many of the patents 
thus far issued appear to be invalid” and at least 61 of 610 plant patents granted by 1943 had 
been developed before 1930 (Allyn 1944, p.57).  Most notably, nursery stock was exempt from 
the rule of prior use.   
Patent examiners were especially lenient in granting patents for nursery stock that Luther 
Burbank had developed with financing from Stark Brothers and that was owned by Stark 
                                           
7 Even though the USPTO was officially in charge of determining whether a plant was “new and distinct,”,the PPA 
allowed it to seek advice from the US Department of Agriculture (USDA).   
8 Talisman was the offspring of Ophelia, introduced in 1912, which was prone to mutation and produced more than 
20 sports (McFarland 1947, pp, 191-192). 
9 Allyn 1944, p. 55.  The principle of excluding plants that had been introduced before the Act was affirmed in Cole 
Nursery Co. vs. Youdath Perennial Garden (1936) over a potential infringement of PP 110, the Horvath Barberry 
plant.  Judge Paul Jones invalidated PP110 because the Horvath plant had been produced in the winter of 1923/24.  
By 1943, the exclusion period had been reduced to one year.     7 
Nurseries after his death (Allyn 1944, p. 54).  In 1933 alone, the USPTO granted 9 patents to 
Burbank’s estate, including two for roses (PP65 and 66, Burbank’s Apple Blossom and 
Burbank’s Golden Sunset) four for plums, two for peaches (PP12, 13, 14, 15, 16, and 18), and 
one for a new variety of cherry (PP41).  As late as 1937 and 1938, the USPTO granted PP 235 
for Burbank’s Golden Comet (in 1937) and PP266, PP267, and PP269 for Burbank’s Copper 
Climber, Burbank’s Snow White Climber, and Burbank’s Dawn Glow (in 1938).  None of these 
posthumously patented roses, however, became a commercial success (Terry 1966). 
 
II. MOST EARLY PLANT PATENTS WERE ROSES 
On August 31, 1931, the Patent Office granted the first plant patent (PP1) to Henry F. 
Bosenberg, a New Jersey gardener (Figure 2) for New Dawn, a continuously blooming bud 
variant of a disease-free and vigorous climbing rose that he selected and propagated (Journal of 
Heredity, 1931, pp. 313-319).
10  Four additional patents were granted in 1931: two for roses, one 
for a dewberry, and one for a new variety of carnation.
11   
  Between August 1931 and April 1, 2009, a total of 19,973 plant patents were granted in 
the United States.  From 1931 to 1940 the number of plant patents per year increased from 5 to 
nearly 90 (Figure 3); with the advent of World War II, patents per year fell to less than 20 in 
                                           
10 New Dawn was nearly identical to a climbing rose that Van Fleet had discovered in his work at the USDA, but 
this older rose bloomed once a year (a dominant trait caused by a single gene) while Bosenberg’s New Dawn 
bloomed continuously throughout the year (following the recessive trait, Kile 1934, pp. 59-61).   
11 Throughout the 1930s the average lag between application and grant was 321 days (calculated from data in “Die 
amerikanischen Pflanzenpatente,” Wirtschaftlicher Teil, 1931-39).  More generally, the lag between a patent 
application and a patent grant varies with the complexity of the patent and the workload of the examiners (Popp, 
Juhl, and Johnson 1994).  For utility patents in the chemical industry in the 1930s, the lag between patent grants and 
patent applications was between two and three years (Moser and Voena, forthcoming); for utility patents of sewing 
machines in the 1870s, the lag was 140 days (Lampe and Moser 2010).   8 
1945; after the war, plant patents recovered to 120 in 1957.  By 1970, the annual number of plant 
patents declined to 52.        
  Nearly 45 percent of all patent grants between 1931 and 1970 were for roses.
  The share 
of rose patents was highest in the 1930s and 1940s; 295 of 592 plant patents between 1930 and 
December 8, 1941, were for roses (Figure 3).  During the war, rose patents declined, reaching a 
low of 4 patents in 1945.  After the war, rose patents they recovered, reaching nearly 70 patents 
in 1955.  After 1955, the number of rose patents per year began to decline gradually, while the 
number of other plant patents stayed roughly constant.
 
Information on the names of patentees (“originators”) from the patent documents reveals 
that all of the top ten patentees were connected with major companies (Table 1).  Eugene S 
Boerner (No. 1) was the single originator on 170 patents between 1940 and 1970; he worked for 
Jackson and Perkins (J&P) for his entire career from 1920 to 1973 and assigned most of his 
patents to J&P.  Herbert C. Swim (No. 2), whom his colleagues called “the best hybridizer of 
them all,” (McGredy and Jennett 1971, p. 65) appears as an originator on 115 patents, and as a 
sole originator on 76 patents.  Swim changed his employer several times, which may have 
lowered his productivity as a breeder. “Now to leave a company…  is a disaster for a hybridist, 
because the breeding stock, the roses he selected and grown to provide pollen and seed, does not 
belong to him and he has to leave it behind and start again” (McGredy and Jennett 1971, p. 65).  
Roy L. Byrum (No. 3) was an associate of the Joseph H. Hill Company of Richmond, IN. 
Josephine D. Brownell (No. 4) of Little Crompton, RI, one of the earliest and most prolific 
female patentees of plants, was married to the owner of Brownell Nursery.  Brownell created two 
tea roses (PP 347 and 458) that were continuously blooming, winter-hardy and resistant to wilt 
and black rust (Stanley 1993, p. 37).  Ralph Moore (No. 5), known as the father of miniature   9 
roses, was a co-owner of Sequoia Nursery in California; Francis and Marie-Louise Meilland 
(Nos. 5 and 10) owned the leading French firm, which often partnered with Conard-Pyle.  
 
Large nurseries drive the increase in patenting
 
  Prolific patentees, such as Gene Boerner and Herbert Swim, assigned most of their 
patents to large nursery firms.  For the late 19
th-century, such assignments, which typically 
transfer patent rights from the inventor to a firm that markets the invention, have been interpreted 
as a sign of improvements in the markets for patented inventions (e.g. Lamoreaux and Sokoloff 
1999).  In the 20
th-century, however, U.S. laws effectively forced employees to assign inventions 
to their firm (Fisk 1998, 2001), so that assignments are a more accurate measure of the share of 
inventions that occurs within firms. 
   Assignment data indicate that commercial breeders account for a disproportionate share 
of rose patents.  Between 1931 and 1970, 77 percent of all rose patents were assigned at issue, 
compared with 58 percent of other plant patents.
12  For example, Bosenberg assigned the rights 
to PP1 for New Dawn to Louis Schubert, who began to market the rose through the Somerset 
Rose Nursery.  Similarly, Robert L. Catron assigned the rights to PP 23 for Better Times to his 
employer, the Joseph H. Hill Company, which developed Better Times to become “the backbone 
of the U.S. cut rose industry until the late 1940s” (Hasek 1980, p. 84).   
  Assignment data also suggest that the increase in patenting until the mid 1950s was 
driven by commercial breeders.  Between 1931 and 1943, the share of assigned rose patents 
                                           
12 In comparison, assignment rates in a sample of Connecticut patents increase from only 1 in 454 patents between 
1837 and 1851 to 1 in 3 patents by 1876 (Moser 2010).  Of 1,341 roses patented between 1931 and 1970, 1,033 
were assigned at issue; 714 were assigned across state lines.     10 
increased from 33 to 82 percent (compared with 40 percent of other plant patents in 1943).  
Between 1943 and 1962, the share of assigned rose patents remained above 80 percent for most 
years.  After 1962, the share of assigned rose patents dropped to 56 percent, while the share of 
other plant patents assigned at issue continued to increase.   
 
III. A BRIEF HISTORY OF COMMERCIAL ROSE BREEDING 
  The importance of patents for commercial rose breeding may be due to two 
characteristics that rose breeding shares with pharmaceuticals:  in both industries, the costs of 
developing new products are high relative to the costs of imitation, and only a small number of 
new products become commercially successful.   
The origins of commercial rose breeding date back to early nineteenth century when 
European merchants brought back Chinese “tea roses” from Asia.  European breeders began to 
cross winter-hardy European roses, which produced clustered short-bloomed pink or red flowers, 
with Chinese tea roses, which produced stems with one large bloom in white, pink, red and even 
the rare yellow for several months (Steward 2007, p. 128).  By the 1840s, French breeders 
succeeded in creating roses that bloomed repeatedly through the summer and fall (Zlesak 2007, 
pp.  271-72).  In 1867, Jean-Baptiste Guillot of Lyon, France, introduced La France, the first 
modern “hybrid tea rose” – a plant with a tall stature and only one large bloom per stem 
(Harkness 1985, pp. 11-20; Zlesak 2007, p. 697).  Breeders relied on pollination by wind or 
insects, and many new varieties originated from self-pollinating roses.  
  Scientific methods of rose breeding began in Stapleford, England, in 1868, when the 
cattle farmer Henry Bennett took pollen from one rose to fertilize the stamens of another.  
Bennett set up a scientific breeding station in a heated green house.  Similar to Stark Brothers,   11 
Bennett relied on secrecy to protect his work: “self-interest compels me for the present to keep 
secret” this “entirely new mode of culture'’ (Harkness 1985, pp.24-25).  Borrowing a term from 
cattle breeding, Bennett promoted his roses as “pedigree” hybrids of the tea rose (Harkness 1985, 
p. 27).  In 1884 he sold the red “William Francis Bennett” for the equivalent of $109,000.
13 
  Using Bennett’s methods, 20
th-century breeders created polyantha, short plants with large 
sprays of small blooms, floribunda, medium stature plants with large clusters of medium-sized 
blooms, and grandiflora, tall plants with small clusters of medium to large-sized blooms 
(Harkness 1985; Zlesak 2007, p. 699).  Today, tea roses are the mainstay of the cut flower 
business, while roses of all types (hybrid teas, polyantha, floribunda, grandiflora, climbers and 
miniature roses) are marketed as garden roses.
 
 
Hobbyists and public sector breeders created high-quality roses before 1930 
Prior to 1930, hobbyists and public sector researchers created a large number of new 
varieties in the United States.  Walter Van Fleet (1857-1922), for example, improved Rosa 
Rugosa and other wild roses to create hardy climbing roses that could withstand the climate of 
the American Northeast.  Van Fleet had left his medical practice in the late 1900s to work as a 
hybridizer for the U.S. Department of Agriculture (USDA).  In 1919 the Massachusetts 
Horticultural Society honored him with the George Robert White Medal of Honor “for advance 
in the hybridization of garden plants, especially of the rose;" the name "’Van Fleet’ is 
synonymous with meritorious climbing roses of American origin" (Journal of Heredity, vol. XI, 
1920, pp. 95-96, also New York Times, January 28, 1922).  
                                           
13 In 2009 purchasing power, using the GDP deflator, www.measuringworth.com   12 
Van Fleet roses such as Rugosa Magnifica, American Pillar, Beauty of Rosemawr, and 
Silver Moon, continue to be considered “the best in the world” (Griffin Lewis 1931, p. 135).  
Rugosa magnifica, for example, is rated 9.0 out of 10 by members of the American Rose Society, 
placing it in the top percentile.  Van Fleet’s rose Silver Moon is rated 7.8 (in the upper range “of 
a very good to solid rose,” compared with an average of 6).
14  Bosenberg’s New Dawn was based 
on a sport of a Van Fleet rose; it is rated 8.5 (“a very good to excellent rose, recommended 
without hesitation” (American Rose Society, 1999, p.3).
 
Van Fleet and other public sector hybridizers helped to spread scientific knowledge about 
rose breeding among hobbyists.  Van Fleet published his “Rose Breeding Notes” in the American 
Rose Annual between 1916 and 1922.  George C. Thomas, of the Society in Southern California, 
argued that any serious rose gardener should try to hybridize roses: “No other form of rose-
culture is so intriguing as breeding new varieties.  It involves but little expenses, and no more 
than reasonable effort…Anyone who has the smallest of greenhouses is foolish not to hybridize 
roses inside” (Thomas 1931, pp. 33-38).   
Hobbyist rose breeders shared their advances freely “over the fence” (Ross 1994).  In 
fact, one of the main goals of the American Rose Society (ARS) was to encourage the diffusion of 
new roses.  In the 1920s, for example, ARS began to encourage the diffusion of Van Fleet’s 
“superb creations” (McFarland 1920, pp.30-31; Pyle 1921, pp. 32-34) 
Commercial nurseries continued to overlook infringements by hobbyists (Swecker 1944, 
p. 122).
15  Today, enthusiasts for “old” roses that were developed before the introduction of La 
France in 1867 are especially passionate about diffusing knowledge of newly-recovered 
                                           
14Ratings between 8.8 and 9.2 are granted to the top 1 percent of all roses, with “major positive features and 
essentially no negatives.”  Rankings are available at Rose files: http://rosefile.com/Tables/xVanFleet.html.  
15 The PPA includes no fair use provision, which would allow for a non-commercial use of a patented plant.   13 
varieties, even if it benefits commercial nurseries.  For example, Carl Cato of the Heritage Rose 
Society 
… believes sincerely in the fellowship that this organization espouses. He's a skilled 
propagator, and has helped return a number of roses to the nursery trade, but when I met him 
he was very definite about the fact that had never sold a rose; he had given them all away.
16   
In addition to the desire to disseminate knowledge, the costs of patenting may have 
discouraged hobbyists from patenting.  Patent fees for plant patents were around $200 in the 
1930s (equivalent to $2,150 in 2009 purchasing power, using the GDP deflator), including filing 
and grant fees of $30 each (equivalent to $322 in 2009 purchasing power, New York Times, 19 
April 1936, 10 Jan. 1938).  Plant patents were, however, cheaper than utility patents, with 
application fees around $500 year in 2009 dollars in 1930 (US House Report No. 96-1307, 96th 
Cong., 2d Sess. (1980); Fisher 1954; Watson 1953). 
 
Commercial rose breeding involves high development costs 
In contrast to hobbyists, commercial breeders had lobbied for patents and began to use 
them swiftly to discourage competitors from propagating new varieties (McGredy and Jennett 
1971, pp. 14, 26-27, 60-86).  Infringement suits typically involved commercial growers.   For 
example, Cole Nursery Co. vs. Youdath Perennial Garden (1936), Kim Bros. v. Hagler (1958), 
Pan-American Plant Co. v. Matsui (1977), and Imazio Nursery, Inc. v, Dania Greenhouses 1995) 
were disputes among nurseries. 
When lobbying for patents, commercial breeders had cited exorbitant development costs.  
Developing a new rose took up to twelve years (Robb 1964, p.389; Stewart 2007, p.131), and 
                                           
16 Christopher 1989, p. 33; also see pp. 36, 66, 84, 18, 203, and 211.   14 
less than 1 in 1,000 seedlings proved commercially successful (Robb 1964, p. 389; Stewart 2007, 
p. 131).  Current methods of commercial rose breeding apply Bennett’s process: breeders extract 
pollen from one flower to fertilize another and create a hybrid seed (de Vries and Dubous 1996, 
p. 241); after that, they propagate seedlings by budding or cuttings to create thousands of plants.  
Breeders, then, select plants with desirable characteristics, such as an intense color or smell, or a 
specific shape, and propagate them to create the next generation of roses.  
This process favors large commercial nurseries that can grow many seedlings at a time.
17 
Boerner, for example, created more than 250,000 crosses per year in the 1940s and 1950s as the 
chief breeder for J&P (Harkness 1979, p. 117; Harkness 1985, p. 74; Beales 1998, p. 677).  By 
1945, “all the large rose producers have their own research departments with a staff of 
scientifically trained personnel” (Sinnock 1945, p. 96).
18   
Large producers, such as J&P, Conard-Pyle, Stark Brothers, DeVor, Weeks, and Hill 
continue to dominate the domestic rose breeding industry today.  Internationally, Tantau 
(Germany), Melliand (France), Harkness (Britain), Wilhelm Kordes Söhne (Germany), Austin 
(Britain), Poulsen (Denmark), Dickson (Britain), Guillot (France) and McGredy (New Zealand)
 
are the leading firms. 
                                           
17 Selecting new plants from random bud variations would be less costly but sports with desirable properties are rare 
and must be noticed, selected, and systematically propagated to become commercially viable (Terry 1966, p.1). 
18 Within these research departments, star breeders play an important role.  For example, Armstrong Nursery was 
unable to develop the nursery stock of Herbert Swim after he left (Zlesak 2007, p. 712; McGredy and Jennett 1971, 
pp. 65-66).  The rose breeding industry is also geographically concentrated, allowing firms to access a larger pool of 
qualified labor.  In 1966 Armstrong Nurseries moved to Wasco, California, a city of 21,000 in the southern San 
Joaquin Valley.  J&P moved its operations to Wasco when it merged with Armstrong in 1968.  Over the next two 
decades, DeVor, Weeks, and other nurseries followed to take advantage of the 280-day growing season, sandy soil, 
inexpensive land, and a growing pool of workers skilled in budding roses.  Today, more than half of all domestically 
produced roses originate from Waco and the surrounding area (Clark 1993, p. 22).  In the 1970s, the cut flower (as 
opposed to garden plants) business began to be dominated by Colombia, Ecuador and other tropical countries with 
long growing seasons, cheap labor, and little regulation (Järvesoo 1983, pp. 323-324).  In 2006, domestic firms 
made up less than 10 percent of the value and less than 5 percent of the volume of U.S. sales (USDA, Floriculture 
and Nursery Crops Yearbook 2007, Table C-15).     15 
 
Copying new varieties is cheap 
In contrast to the costly development process, replication is quick and easy.  Bennett had 
already noted in the 1880s that the outcome of his scientific methods of breeding would be 
vulnerable to imitation and he relied on secrecy to protect his inventions.  If discovered, new 
roses could quickly be replicated by repeated grafting; a plant would produce 10 grafts by 
January, which could be used to make 100 by March, and these could be used to make 1,000 by 
May (Harkness 1985, p. 25).  As a result, the price of new roses fell quickly: this was equivalent 
to more than a 90 percent decrease in the first year.  Once discovered, “a new variety would be 
placed upon the market and within a year or so it would be listed in nearly all nursery catalogs” 
(Sinnock 1945, p. 95).  
The only way a grower could make a profit on a new rose before 1930 was to build up, as 
secretly as possible, all the stock his capital permitted, then throw it all on the market at the 
top prices people would pay.  In a year or so, competitors would be building up their own 
stocks grown from the no-longer-secret variety, now widely distributed (Kneen 1948, p. 363). 
For example, the U.S. firm Conard & Jones invested two years to develop Rosa Hugonis (aka 
Father Hugo Rose) for the American market, but lost out to other nurserymen, who had quietly 
propagated the rose and were able to capitalize on Conard’s advertising efforts, while offering 
their own roses at a lower price (Moon 1920, pp.49-51).
19    
 
IV. DID PLANT PATENTS CREATE A DOMESTIC BREEDING INDUSTRY? 
                                           
19 Rosa hugonis was originally bred in England in 1899, so that, had it been patented in the United States, Conard 
would have had to purchase the rights to it from its original breeders.   16 
  If high development costs and easy imitation discouraged nurseries from developing new 
varieties, the creation of IPRs may have encouraged innovation and facilitated the development 
of a domestic plant breeding industry.  
Prior to 1930, the US was not competitive in the field of plant breeding and especially of rose 
breeding.  Most of the new roses came from second, third, and fourth generation hybridizers 
of Europe.  Today… more than half the finest plant breeders and especially those breeding 
new varieties of roses are at work here in the U.S. (Hart 1965, p. 93).
 
   
Import data, however, indicate that the U.S. dependency on European nursery stock 
began to weaken prior to the Act.  Between 1930 and 1932, the number of rose plants imported 
into the United States declined from 12,916,461 in 1930 to 10,025,162 in 1931 and 6,715,588 in 
1932 (Figure 4).  This decline was too early and too large to be due to three roses that were 




World War II cuts off European imports 
When demand recovered, World War II disrupted the production of roses in Europe 
(Harkness 1985, pp. 51-52, 93, 104, 141).  The English rose breeder Walter Easlea II (1859-
1945) deplored  
Not within living memory has there been such a shortage of rose plants for sale in Great 
Britain as there is in this season of 1944-45.  This is mainly due to government restrictions 
                                           
20 The Smoot-Hawley Tariffs Act of June 1930, intended to protect the domestic agricultural industry (Irwin 1998, 
Eichengreen 1988), did not raise tariffs on roses.  Rose plants, budded, grafted, or grown on their own roots were 
charged an import tariff of 4 cents per plant in 1913, 1922, and 1930 (“Comparison of Tariff Acts of 1913, 1922 and 
1930, with Index” House, Committee on Ways and Means, Congress Session 71-3 (1930), document date 1931, 
p.80).  Tariff rates remained constant throughout the 1930s and were reduced for a select group of countries 
(Belgium, Netherlands, and Luxemburg) in 1948 and for the remaining countries in the 1960s (Corder and Parisi, 
1959, pp. 103-04).   17 
on land that can be used for growing rose plants.  Some growers who formerly produced 
500,000 plants for sale have budded only 20,000 for the past two seasons (American Rose 
Annual 1945, p. 46). 
   
Unable to exports grown plants, European nurseries began to export nursery stock to U.S. firms.  
Meilland, for example, sent nursery stock for the Peace rose to be propagated by Pyle; the stock 
left France on the last plane before the German occupation in 1940 (Meilland 1984, p. 4; 
McGredy and Jennett 1971, p. 13).   
American breeders made good use of the opportunity to propagate European plants and 
expand their own business:  “WW-II left it open for the American rose industry to take off, and 
take off it did, with Gene Boerner and J&P as major contributors” (Cunningham 2005).  
 
Gene Boerner’s mass hybridization program  
Born to German-emigrant parents in Wisconsin in 1893, Gene Boerner joined J&P in 
1920.  Known as “Papa Floribunda,” Boerner hybridized more than 60 floribunda roses, 
including 11 All American Rose Selections (AARS) winners (American Rose Annual 1945, p. 
225; Beales 1998, p. 677).  Boerner also acted as a “hybridizing father” to the New Zealander 
Sam McGredy (Harkness 1985, p. 77) and the younger members of the German family firm 
Wilhelm Kordes Söhne referred to him as “Uncle Gene.” 
As the chief breeder of J&P, Boerner led the company’s mass hybridization program in 
Newark, New York in the 1940s and 1950s.  Sam McGredy argued that the existence of patent 
protection encouraged the creation of mass hybridization in the United States:   18 
The Americans were the first to have plant patents and that fact encouraged the rise of mass 
hybridization techniques in the States, of the techniques of the modern rose-breeding business 
(McGredy and Jennett 1971, p. 51). 
Many of J&P’s most successful products, however, were based on European roses, and 
especially Kordes roses, which J&P began to propagate after the onset of the war.  In 1939, J&P 
licensed Kordes’ World’s Fair, which won one of the first four AARS awards in 1940 and 
became a great commercial success in the US.  Its popularity allowed the J&P to capture a large 
market share and eliminate the middlemen by becoming a major mail order retail company.
21   
In 1942, J&P introduced Pinocchio, which Kordes had developed in 1940 and named 
after the Disney movie of the same year (Cunningham 2005).  Boerner used Pinocchio to create 
Masquerade, of which Harkness (1985, pp. 75-76) says: “no rose of that kind had ever been 
seen.  The nearest to it was an old China rose, Mutabalis, a shrub which proceeded from buds of 
saffron to magenta in its old age."  Fashion, one of the first coral-colored American roses, was 
Boerner’s second triumph derived from Pinocchio (Harkness 1985, pp. 75-76).  Boerner also 
used Pinocchio to create Lavender Pinocchio (PP947), which continues to be prominent today.   
He used Crimson Glory, developed by Wilhelm Kordes in 1935, to create Diamond Jubilee 
(registered in 1947).
22   
During World War I, the ability to access foreign-owned patents and produce foreign-
owned inventions had encouraged domestic invention in organic chemicals (Moser and Voena 
2010).  World War II may have had a similar effect on U.S. roses.  Under the Trading with the 
Enemy Act (TWEA), domestic producers were not required to pay license fees for roses that 
                                           
21 http://www.jacksonandperkins.com/gardening/GP/gatepage/history, accessed December 28, 2010. 
22 Data from www.helpmefind.com. No systematic price data are available for this period, but proponents of IPRs 
argue that the introduction of plant patents lowered the prices that nurseries charged to consumers.  Kneen (1948, 
p.363), for example, observed that the thorn-less Festival rose, which was introduced in 1940, sold for “much less 
than fancy new roses brought in pre-patent days” and that “Today buyers no longer have to pay $5 or $10 for a new 
rose, $10 for a new iris or gladiolus bulb, $20 for a fancy dahlia.”    19 
German or French firms like Kordes, Tantau, and Meilland had patented in the United States (US 
Office of the Alien Property Custodian 1946, p. 202).  Boerner kept royalties for Kordes in 
escrow and repaid Kordes after the war to help rebuild their firm (Cunningham 2005), but it is 
unlikely that he could fully compensate the Kordes firm for the profits that it lost as a result of 
U.S. competition.  
Boerner’s floribunda were also based on European roses; he created them by refining 
small-flowered polyantha rose that the Danish nursery Poulsen had developed in the 1920s 
(McGredy and Jennett 1971, pp. 60-61; Harkness 1985, p. 92).  Thus, Boerner’s case suggests 
that access to European roses was at least as important as patents to the development of U.S. 
plant breeding.   
   
V.  REGISTRATIONS OF NEW ROSES 
Why did rose patents increase so quickly after the creation of IPRs?  Contemporaries 
observed that nurseries that marketed new varieties without patents risked “having someone turn 
up a little later with a patent” threatening to sue for infringement (Kile 1934, pp. 61-62).  The 
“Plant Patent Act makes it almost a necessity to take out patents on all valuable new varieties”; 
growers would soon learn “the necessity of handling only such new plants as have been 
patented” (Kile 1934, pp. 61-62).  Large nurseries, which drove the increase in rose patents, were 
more likely to be sued and may have used patents strategically to protect themselves from 
litigation. 
To separate increases in strategic patents from changes in innovation, we create an 
alternative measure of innovation.  This measure is based on the number of new varieties that   20 
were registered with the American Rose Society (ARS) between 1916 and 1970.
23  Unlike 
patenting, registering a new plant does not create property rights that could be enforced in court 
(Loscher 1986, pp. 59-62), so that registrations cannot be used strategically in the same way as 
patents.  Breeders register the name of new varieties for the simple purpose of naming the plant 
and for the prestige that it brings to them and the namesake of a rose. 
 Registration data include unique names for U.S. and foreign roses.
24  An entry in the 
American Rose Annual of 1926 (p. 188), for example, includes the name of the rose, the name of 
its originator, and the date of the registration: 
Sarah Van Fleet, H. Rug, by the American Rose Society, June 29, 1925
25 
Matching rose patents with registrations makes it possible to estimate the share of newly-
created roses that were patented.  One difficulty with this process is that plant patents typically 
do not list the name of a rose.  To address this problem, we first appended common names to 
patent records, using a publication of the American Association of Nurserymen (Plant Patents 
                                           
23 ARS was originally established in 1892, 16 years after the Royal National Rose Society in Britain was formed in 
1876.  Although European horticulturalists had begun to discuss the establishment of an international rose register in 
the 1910s, World War I disrupted their efforts.  ARS, however, pushed ahead and became an early leader in rose 
registration. It was a “welcome candidate” in 1955 to become the International Cultivar Registration Authority (or 
ICRA) for the Genus, Rosa L. (Vrugtman 1986, pp. 225-228), assuming global responsibility to register new roses.  
Rose societies in Australia, France, Germany, India, Italy, Japan, the Netherlands, New Zealand, South Africa, 
Switzerland, and the United Kingdom serve as “regional representatives.” ARS is one of 70 ICRAs currently 
operating under the International Code of Nomenclature for Cultivated Plants (ICNCP), charged with registering 
names for different groups of plants.  Systems of biological registration date back to Aristotle’s classification of 
animals and the Inquiry in Plants by his student, Theophrastus. The Swedish botanist Carl Linnaeus (1707-1778) 
extended these lists to create the modern taxonomy of plants.   
24 Commercial breeders typically employ different trade names in different countries.  For example, the French rose 
Madame Ferdinand Jamin was marketed as American Beauty in the United States.  To create unique identifiers, rose 
breeders developed a parallel system of code names, which consist of a three-letter prefix that designates the breeder 
followed by letters or numbers that denote the specific variety. The competing systems led to disputes in the early 
1980s, which ARS resolved by adjusting its classification system (Gioia 1986, pp. 265-71).  
25 In 1930, J. Horace McFarland, the Annual’s long-time editor, combined this information with material on foreign 
roses into the first edition of Modern Roses.  We use the 12th edition of Modern Roses (Young, Schorr and Baer, 
2007).    21 
with Common Names).
26  Ninety-six percent of all plant patents between 1931 and 1970 can be 
matched with common names.  We then use the variety’s name, its originator, and the 
originator’s location to match patents with registrations.  For example, we match 
‘Polar Bear’, registered in 1934 by ‘Nicolas’ with  
PP132, ‘Polar Bear’ by the originator ‘Jean H. Nicolas’ granted in 1935  
 
Ninety percent of patents, 1,241 between 1931 and 1970, can be matched with at least one 
registration.  Some patents are matched with more than one registration because alternative 
spellings or abbreviations are recorded to create a complete record of names.  For example, Irene 
of Denmark is also registered as Irene von Dänemark and Doctor F. Debat is also registered as 
Dr. F. Debat.  Duplicates of this type account for 17 percent of registrations, but there is no 
evidence of systematic variation.  To be conservative, we repeat all tests with and without 
duplicates. 
 
Less than one-fifth of new varieties are patented 
Registration data indicate that only a minority of new varieties was patented.  Including 
duplicates, only 18 percent of new varieties between 1931 and 1970 were patented (1,341 of 
7,436, Figure 5).  Excluding duplicates, only 16 percent of new roses were patented.  Low 
patenting rates are consistent with results in other data sets that capture innovations with and 
without patents.  For example, roughly 20 percent of machinery innovations exhibited at the 
                                           
26 The American Association of Nurserymen was formed in 1876 and is now called the American Nursery and 
Landscape Association. It has administered the National Association of Plant Patent Owners (NAPPO) which was 
organized in 1939 to address the “gross misunderstanding within the trade and in the minds of the public as to the 
whole concept of plant patents” (White 1975, p. 254).   22 
Crystal Palace World Fair of 1851 were patented.  Similar to breeders of fruit and roses, 19
th-
century inventors of machinery could not depend on secrecy to protect their innovations because 
new machines (unlike dyes or other types of chemical innovations) could be easily copied 
(Moser 2010).   
The share of patented varieties increased as breeders learned to use the patent system and 
became concerned about litigation.  In 1932, 11 percent of new varieties were patented; by 1954, 
26 percent of new varieties were patented (Figure 5, excluding duplicates).  Patenting rates spike 
briefly to 31 and 33 percent in 1942 and 1952, possibly due to changes in the speed of 
examination.  In the mid-1950s, patenting rates began to decline; by the late 1960s, only 14 
percent of new varieties were patented.
27  
  Changes in the number of new varieties per year closely track the conditions of the 
European rose breeding industry.  From 1900 to 1920, registrations per year stayed relatively 
constant around 100, with a significant dip during World War I (Figure 6).  From the 1920s to 
the late 1930s, rose registrations increased to above 200 per year, with a dip during the early 
years of the Great Depression, when demand for roses decreased in the United States and abroad.  
As World War I devastated the European rose industry, registrations declined to less than 100 
per year until 1950; registrations did not go back to the pre-war path of growth until the 1960s. 
 
Europeans create most varieties after 1931 while U.S. varieties decline 
 
                                           
27 This decline cannot be due to truncation:  Our data continue until 1978, and roses that were registered by 1970 
were patented within two years of their registration date.     23 
Data on the national origins of breeders reveal that European breeders continued to 
account for the majority of new varieties.  Consistent with historical accounts, the data indicate 
that, until the turn of the 20
th century, nearly all new roses were created by European breeders. 
Moreover, all except two of the top ten breeders in terms of new varieties are European (Table 
2).  Wilhelm Kordes Söhne leads the list with 259 registrations. Including 133 registrations by 
the younger Reimer Kordes (No.10) increases the number of Kordes registrations to nearly 400, 
double the number of registrations of the French nursery Gaujard (with 201 registrations).   
Eugene Boerner is the only American in the list of the top ten breeders, with 198 
registrations (No. 3).  Francis Meilland of the French family firm Meilland follows with 178 
registrations (No. 4), then the German breeder Mathias Tantau (No. 5, 172 registrations), the 
Spanish breeder Pedro Dot (no. 6, 154 registrations), the French breeder C. Mallerin (a retired 
railway worker who acted as a mentor to the Meillands, No.7, 153 registrations) and Delbard-
Chabert (No. 8, 145 registrations).  Sam McGredy, the Irishman who immigrated to New 
Zealand, is No. 9, with 135 registrations. 
Most strikingly, the data indicate that U.S. breeders contributed fewer varieties after the 
creation of patents in 1930.  In the early decades of the 20
th-century, when Van Fleet and other 
public sector breeders and hobbyists were active, registrations by U.S. breeders increased to 
account for 39 percent of all new varieties between 1900 and 1930.  After the passage of the 
Plant Patent Act, registrations by U.S. breeders declined to 21 percent between 1931 and 1970, 
when the next Act extended patent rights to sexually-propagated plants. 
 
CONCLUSIONS   24 
Did the Plant Patent Act of 1930 help create the modern American rose breeding 
industry?  Using plant patents as the sole indicator of innovation suggests that the answer is yes:  
large-scale breeding efforts of American firms, such as Jackson & Perkins, Armstrong, Weeks, 
and Conard-Pyle contribute a staggering share of U.S. plant patents grants between 1930 and 
1970, and large commercial breeders dominate the list of the top ten patentees. 
A closer look, however, suggests that patents played at best a secondary role, and that 
U.S. breeders mostly used patents strategically to protect themselves from litigation.  Data on 
registrations of new varieties reveal that only a small share of new varieties, less than 20 percent, 
was patented.  Moreover, European breeders continued to contribute the large majority of new 
varieties, and only one U.S. breeder, J&P’s Gene Boerner, is among the top ten breeders in terms 
of new varieties.  In fact, the share of new varieties created by U.S. breeders dropped after the 
creation of plant patents, from nearly 40 percent from 1900 to 1930 to slightly over 20 percent 
from 1900 to 1970.   
Notably, some of the most successful American roses, including Walter Van Fleet’s 
hardy American climbers, were creations of the pre-patent period.  Other prominent American 
roses such as Conard-Pyle’s Peace rose, or J&P’s Pinnocchio were originally bred by European 
firms.  American nurseries began to propagate these roses when World War II suspended 
European imports and talented breeders like Gene Boerner improved European roses to create 
the American rose.    25 
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TABLE 1 – BREEDERS WITH THE LARGEST NUMBER OF U.S. PLANT PATENTS, 1931-1970  
Breeder 
 
Years of professional 
activity 
(Years of patenting) 
Nursery/ common 
assignee  Patents 
 
      All  Single-
authored  Weighted 
Eugene S. Boerner (1893-
1966)  1943-1973 (1940-1970)  Jackson & Perkins  170  170  170 
Herbert C. Swim  1941-1982 (1940-1983)  Armstrong, Conard-
Pyle, Weeks  115  76  95.5 
Roy L. Byrum  1930-1974 (1935-1974)  Hill  54  53  53.5 
Josephine D. Brownell  1940s and 50s (1932-
1955)  Brownell Nurseries  50  49  49.5 
Ralph S. Moore (1907-
2009) 
1927 - 2008 (1948-
2008)  Sequoia Nursery  49  49  49 
Francis Meilland (1912-
1958)  1912-1958 (1912-1958)  Conard-Pyle  42  42  42 





De Vor  37  37  37 
Dennison H. Morey 
(d.2000)  1957-1980 (1958-1967)  Jackson & Perkins  29  29  29 
Frederick H. Howard (ca. 
1874-1948)  1916-1956 (1932-1949)  Howard & Smith  26  26  26 
Marie Louise Meilland  1958-1994 (1958-1990)  Conard-Pyle  23  23  23 
Notes: Breeders’ names are collected from the full text of patent documents at www.uspto.gov. Years of 
professional activity are measured by the years when a breeder registered new roses according to a directory of 











TABLE 2 – BREEDERS WITH THE LARGEST NUMBER OF ROSE REGISTRATIONS, 1931-1970  
Breeder  Country of origin  Registrations 
     
Wilhelm Kordes Söhne   Germany  259 
Gaujard  France  201 
Eugene Boerner  US  198 
Francis Meilland  France  178 
Mathias Tantau  Germany  172 
Petro Dot  Spain  154 
Charles Mallerin  France  153 
Delbard-Chabert   France  145 
Samuel McGredy IV  New Zealand  139 
Reimer Kordes  Germany  133 




FIGURE 1 – A CAGE THAT STARK BROTHERS BUILT AROUND ITS GOLDEN DELICIOUS APPLE 
 
Notes: The cage was built around the Stark Brother’s Golden Delicious tree to prevent competitors from 
stealing shoots of the tree; it was equipped with an alarm.  Image from Rossman 1931, p. 395. 2 
 
FIGURE 2 – PLANT PATENT USPTO PP1 
 
Notes: The first plant patent was granted to Henry F. Bosenberg on August 18, 1931 for a 
climbing or trailing rose that he observed in the wild.  Bosenberg’s rose, which became 
known as New Dawn, was a sport – a random bud variation – of another rose that Walter 
Van Fleet had developed before 1922.  Image from the United States Patent Office 
www.uspto.gov.3 
 
FIGURE 3 – PLANT PATENTS PER YEAR, 1931-1970 
 
 
Notes: Plant patents from the USPTO Patent Statistic Reports (available at www.uspto.gov).   
 4 
 
FIGURE 4 – ROSE IMPORTS INTO THE UNITED STATES 
 
Notes: Data on rose plants imported per year from US Department of Commerce, Foreign 
Commerce and Navigation of the US, various years, US Bureau of the Census, Foreign 




FIGURE 5 – SHARE OF REGISTRATIONS WITH PATENTS 
 
Notes: Data on rose patents from American Association of Nurserymen, Plant Patents and 
Common Names, 1963, 1969, 1974. Data on rose registrations from the American Rose 
Society. Some new varieties of roses were registered more than once, using alternative 
abbreviations or spellings or translated names. To account for this, the line “w duplicates” 
includes multiple registration for the same rose, and “wo duplicates” counts multiple 













FIGURE 6 – REGISTRATIONS AND PLANTS PATENTS FOR ROSES   
 
Notes: Data on rose registrations per year from the records of the American Rose Society. 




FIGURE 7 – ROSE REGISTRATIONS BY BREEDER’S NATIONAL ORIGIN, 
 EUROPEAN UNION (EU), UNITED STATES (US), AND REST OF WORLD (ROW) 
 
 
Notes. Data on breeders’ country of origin are collected from registrations of new varieties in 
Young, Schorr and Baer (2007). 
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